Abstract-The increasing number of embedded instruments used to perform test, monitoring, calibration and debug within a semiconductor device has called for a brand new standardthe IEEE 1687. Such a standard resorts to a reconfigurable scan network to provide efficient and flexible access to instruments and to handle complex structures. As it has to deliver reliable service, many approaches, both formal and simulation-based, have been proposed in the literature to perform test, diagnosis and verification of such networks. This paper focuses on the problem of post-silicon validation of a network, a problem that has not been adequately addressed, yet. We analyze the mismatches between the specification and its silicon implementation, and we propose a methodology to detect a subset of them by applying functional patterns and observing the length of the active scan path. Experimental results on ITC2016 benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed approach is broadly applicable, and able to generate very effective sequences. We also classify mismatches that cannot be targeted relying exclusively on the active scan path length information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the standard IEEE 1687-2014 [1] , also known as IJTAG, is being increasingly adopted by the semiconductor industry for arranging access to internal scan chains during scan-based test as well as for accessing dedicated embedded instrumentation such as SerDes conditioning and error monitoring circuits, memory BIST, temperature and voltage sensors, and many others alike. Since both production test and in-field monitoring processes majorly depend on such embedded instruments and other features, it is of utmost importance to ensure their correct operation. Therefore, many approaches, both formal and functional, have been proposed in the literature to perform test [2] - [7] , diagnosis [8] and verification [9] - [11] of IEEE 1687 networks. However, the correct operation of IJTAG-compliant infrastructure is a product of many aspects and components including the actual hardware on the chip, the respective standard descriptions, such as ICL (Instrument Connectivity Language) and PDL (Procedure Description Language) files as well as the software used to import the descriptions and control the hardware.
The importance of the problem is being escalated by previous experience of the electronics industry, which suffered from the inconsistency between description files and actual hardware implementation of an earlier similar standard: IEEE 1149.1. In surprisingly numerous cases, the BSDL (Boundary Scan Description Language) descriptions did not match the actual implementation of JTAG features in silicon. Most of those mismatches were caused by simply non-matching revisions of the silicon and the BSDL, but of course a certain number of problems were related to bugs and design errors in hardware. Even if the error-checking is performed before tapeout, it does not necessarily imply that the silicon will work or that the ICL matches the actual silicon implementation. Independent of particular reasons causing such mismatches, the task of proving full compliance between the silicon and the documentation is not trivial. Taking into account the fact that the infrastructure described by IEEE 1687 is certainly more complex than classical Boundary Scan, ensuring its correct operation is an important research topic.
This paper is focused on the problem of checking the equivalence between the silicon implementation of IEEE 1687 RSNs and their respective ICL descriptions. The method we describe assumes that the former is a black box and the latter plays the role of specification, while no other information about the target system is available. Although observability of signals in simulation (for pre-silicon verification) is exceptional, this is unfortunately not the case when accessing the read device through its interface, i.e. we can only apply stimuli and observe responses through scan input and output ports.
Previous work that addresses this problem is very limited. The problem's general definition along with a trivial algorithm for simple RSNs was first proposed in EU FP7 BASTION project report [12] . An important contribution of that work was in defining three levels of validation thoroughness with respect to required test access and effort. At the base level ("Level 0") the RSN infrastructure is validated by checking scan chain length and capture values in various configurations ensuring that every instrument is correctly accessible.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we introduce a comprehensive fault model defined as a set of mismatches between the ICL description and the silicon implementation. Second, for a subset of mismatches falling into Level 0 category, we propose a universal method and a tool of their detection based on observing the length of the active scan path. In addition, we categorize the mismatches with respect to the level of detection difficulty providing a list of those undetectable by our method. Experimental results based on the set of ITC2016 RSN benchmarks [13] demonstrate that the proposed approach is broadly applicable as well as that the test tool is able to generate the sequences for detecting all target mismatches. The proposed validation tool is a part of an ecosystem of IEEE 1687 benchmarks and tools [14] , which can be freely used in connection with the benchmarks 1 . The following section provides necessary terminology and background information. Section III describes the fault model, the detection method and the respective tool. Experimental results are given in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY
The RSN is an instrument access network residing between device interface and instrument interface. Through dynamic reconfiguration of the RSN, instruments placed on different segments can either be selected or bypassed by controlling RSN's configurable components. This mechanism enables flexibility and facilitates the embedded instrumentation access from the chip boundary. The RSN infrastructure consists of scan registers, multiplexers, control signals and combinational logic.
Active scan path includes all scan cells (flip-flops) connected between SI and SO for a given state of the network. A SIB corresponds to an in-line 2-to-1 ScanMux whose (C)SU control bit is placed next to the multiplexer. SIB allows the scan chain to expand by including nested segment between terminals tsi and fso into the active path. When in this state, SIB is referred to as asserted (opened). Otherwise, SIB is said to be in a de-asserted (closed) state, bypassing the tsi-fso segment with only one bit between si and so. Two types of SIBs are defined depending on the control bit 1 https://gitlab.com/IJTAG position with respect to the multiplexer: the pre-SIB (Fig. 1a) , if a multiplexer precedes the control bit and the post-SIB (Fig. 1b) if a multiplexer is placed after the control bit. Adopted symbolic representation of a SIB is given in Fig. 1c .
Apart from inserting, i.e., bypassing certain segments, ScanMuxes can enable the existence of mutually exclusive, selectable scan chains. They can be used in in-line and remote configurations. In the latter case, source of a multiplexer's control input (control bit, decoded TAP instruction) is located outside the scan segment that contains element being controlled. A simplified schematic containing one in-line (SM1) and one remotely controlled (SM2) 2-to-1 ScanMux with their corresponding (SU) control bits is given in Fig. 1d . The symbol shown in the same figure (Fig. 1e ) is adopted as a representation of a ScanMux control bit throughout the paper.
III. METHODOLOGY
The proposed methodology is based on previous work focused on generating efficient patterns to perform end-ofmanufacturing test for RSNs [3] . The detection mechanism introduced first in [4] and then adopted in several works [5] , [6] has been modified to reduce significant overhead and has been made more suitable for addressing the presented problem.
A. Mismatch model
Well-established metrics exist for post-manufacturing tests (single-stuck-at coverage, transition fault coverage) and experimental results have demonstrated the effectiveness of such metrics. Although pre-silicon verification metrics are less standardized (syntactic (code coverage) and semantic (covering assertion goals)), metrics for post-silicon validation are still the subject of research. The list of considered mismatches was created after analyzing the literature and taking into account that the source of a mismatch is usually confined, such as a typo in the specification, or a localized hardware bug. It contains following items:
• A missing register Table I provides a set of considered mismatches joined by their type.
Relying on the structural information provided by the ICL is sufficient for detecting a missing register at one of the scan segments, since this type of mismatch directly affects the length of the active scan path. An added register has the similar effect on the scan path length although this time it is reduced with respect to the expected one. A wrong register with 
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not modelled explicitly SWAP MUX INPUTS not modelled explicitly the different length is equivalent to having a missing and/or added register. Exchanging the registers is being performed not only within the same scan segment but also outside of one domain. This modification can be modelled as having multiple wrong register length mismatches. Since the registers belong to different scan segments, not having both of them on the same path for the first time they are accessed enables immediate detection of this particular mismatch. Even though a mismatch of exchanged ScanMux control signals (Fig.3a) or inputs (Fig.3b) does not have an effect on the active path length it can still be detected. The configuration of the ScanMux is determined by the value in the control bit. The output signal from the update stage, apart from controlling the multiplexer can also be used to gate shift, update and capture. In that case, if upper input is selected, all data shifted at the input is supposed to go through T DR 1 and appear at the output. However, in case of exchanged control signals, although the segment is chosen according to the configuration, all operations are forbidden on that segment and allowed on the other one. Consequently, shifted values will not propagate to the output, resulting in all 0s or all 1s, depending on the value stored in the last scan cell in the selected input segment. Exchanging input connections is an equivalent mismatch and can be analyzed in a similar way. Guaranteeing that all scan segments are accessed at least once ensures that all mismatches of this type are detected.
Another type of considered mismatch is a ScanMux with configurations incorrectly assigned to its input segments. In Fig. 3c, configurations 00 , 01, 10 and 11 result in including registers TDR 0 , TDR 1 , TDR 2 , TDR 3 into the scan path, respectively. In case of a mismatch, chosen registers appear in the different order: TDR 3 , TDR 2 , TDR 0 , TDR 1 . If at least one of the segments has a length different than the original one in the same position, the mismatch is detectable comparing the lengths. This type of mismatch also covers the modified order of control bits (cb 0 , cb 1 -10 with 01).
In case of the wrong SIB module type (pre-/post-), the length and the order of elements on the scan segment remains unchanged when SIB is de-asserted. If there are some control bits in the controlled segment-their order is shifted for one position, while the SIB itself is placed after, i.e., before the elements of the included segment.
In general, mismatches involving the modified order of TDRs, SIBs and ScanMuxes do not affect the length of the active path when the corresponding segment is included into it. However, detecting them remains possible as long as certain configuration bits do not match original positions. Writing into them to set the desired configuration may result in writing into TDRs or some other configuration bits. 
B. Undetectable mismatches
A mismatch is considered to be undetectable if applying whichever legal configuration results in observing expected length of the scan path.
The modified functionality of the register has been modelled as a permutation of register's bit scan cells and it is equivalent to having permuted connections with the instrument. Since there is no effect on the length of the scan path, this type ! ! of mismatch is undetectable. Exchanged position of registers within the same scan segment may not always be detectable. In particular, this is the case if the registers are adjacent or have the same length. Furthermore, if there is not even a single control bit cell located in between, all configurations are properly applied and no mismatch is observed at the output. In the case of exchanging two or more SIBs within the same scan segment, the mismatch is undetectable if they have completely same structure (the position, length and type of modules), except if they provide access to remote ScanMux control bits. Wrong configuration mismatch is also undetectable when all input segments have the same fixed length (only TDRs).
Potentially, by "Level 1" validation [12] , some currently undetectable mismatches could be targeted. Correct reaction of instruments on PDL defined-actions has to be verified upon accessing them through performing read and write operations. Furthermore, the presence of undocumented or specially hidden structures can be targeted by "Level 2" validation (phantom detection) [12] .
C. Detection mechanism
The procedure for detecting mismatches is organized as a set of sessions. A session consists of a configuration pattern to which an additional sequence of bits is appended. It contains values for defining the state of the network. The appended sequence is used as a key to validate that the expected path is connected between scan input and scan output pins. Configuration sequence of bits has the length of the currently active path. This sequence of bits is shifted into the scan chain, while in parallel the output pin is monitored. If the sequence observed at the output, long as it is the key sequence presented at the input, matches the very same key, it is considered that no potential mismatch could be detected in that session. This is due to the effect of a mismatch which can either corrupt the values of the key loaded into the network (e.g., all 0s or all 1s) or can change its position (postpone it or anticipate it at the output) with respect to the expected one.
Additionally, if a TAP controller is used to control and access the network, its state machine has to traverse capture and update states, while the shift state can be omitted. Therefore, before shifting in the sequence, a capture operation is performed. The values appearing at the output during the shiftin are capture values and can be used to enhance detection capability. The pause state, following the shift state of the TAP controller can be used to prevent performing update before checking the pattern at the output, thus avoiding undesired effects such as moving the network to an unknown state.
Cost of applying one session is equal to the number of clock cycles (shift operations) as long as the active path increased by the length of a key. It should be mentioned that after performing update to apply wanted configuration, reaching the shift state in a state machine requires certain number of clock cycles (JTAG protocol overhead).
D. Algorithm
The mismatch detection is solved as a problem of discriminating between a set of Finite State Machines (FSMs). One FSM is created for the original network without any mismatch present; for each mismatch, an additional FSM is created. Initial state is appended to each FSM, where the state corresponds to the current configuration of the network. Positions of configuration (control) bits with respect to the network's input are being tracked constantly. After applying the transition (reconfiguration operation), the state of each FSM is updated, while the new length (output symbol) is calculated based on the injected mismatch, if any. Additionally, positions of the configuration bits in a new state are calculated and updated accordingly.
Before generating input symbols, during the construction of the internal network model, every reconfigurable element (ScanMux, SIB) in the network is annotated with auxiliary information. First attribute is the hierarchical level (l c ) of the scan segments in which the module is positioned, while the second one is the highest hierarchical level (l d ) of all modules' levels that are positioned within scan segment(s) attached to the input(s) of the current module. In Fig. 4b a structural representation of the network from Fig. 4a is shown as an example in the form of a tree. A node coincides with the reconfigurable module, while encoding of the segment that is either insertable (SIB) or selectable (ScanMux) is given as a vertex. Nodes n 1 , n 2 and n 3 are located at the top level scan segment, while nodes n 31 , n 32 and n 33 are accessible through n 3 (located in its input segment(s)). Nodes n 11 (1, 1) and n 13 (1, 1) provide access only to empty segments and segments that include either TDRs or control bits (registers), which is obviously not the case with the node n 12 (1, 2) . This node provides access to the segment at the second level of hierarchy with one node n 121 (2, 2) in it.
The mechanism for generating input symbols is able to determine if the network contains remotely controlled scan multiplexer architecture or all modules are controlled in-line. In the first case, the priority list for accessing nodes is shown in Fig. 4b . The n i node's position in the list is based on the l i d value; the precedence is given to the node with the higher values. However, if the nodes n i and n j have equal value of the second parameter (l
, the position is decided based on the first parameter value l c . Finally, in case that l i c = l j c the nodes whose parent nodes are closer to the input are chosen first e.g., n 11 has precedence in comparison to n 31 , while n 31 is put before n 33 .
The procedure (Algorithm 1) starts from the position of all configuration bits, taking into account only accessible ones when choosing the element from the priority list (Fig. 4b) . When it is a SIB instance, if it is in a de-asserted state, new configuration sets it to assert, while if it is a ScanMux with no children nodes, one configuration is generated for every input segment in order to include it to the active path at least once. For a ScanMux with some reconfigurable nodes in its input segments the decision which configuration to set ! ! is based on the priority list. In that sense n 3 could be a SIB with three serially connected nodes n 31 , n 32 , n 33 located at the same segment, but it could also be a ScanMux with three input segments; in first n 31 , in second n 32 , and in third n 33 . When a segment is included to the active path it is marked as tested. If all children nodes for a parent SIB node are marked as tested, the next configuration will also de-assert that SIB.
In this work we also considered more complex networks involving remotely controlled scan multiplexer architecture. They are more difficult to manage in terms of module's controllability and observability: corresponding control bits have to be part of the active path in order to set desired configuration, while additional reconfiguration operations are required to include the module itself into the active path. Therefore, an algorithm (Algorithm 2) implemented with two recursive functions CONFIGUREMUX and PUTONPATH provides input symbols for guaranteeing that all scan segments are accessed at least once, while also detecting the full set of considered, detectable mismatches. The order in which multiplexers are provided is obtained using the same rule as in the previous algorithm with the difference that is performed once, globally, taking all multiplexers into consideration (Fig.  4c) . IV. EXPERIMENTS We developed a prototypical tool, able to build an internal simplified RSN model by reading the ICL description of the network. After generation of selected mismatches, pattern generation is run. Upon completion, a report is generated with the list of applied configurations, set of covered mismatches and those which are considered as undetectable.
Experimental results using the proposed mismatch model and pattern generation algorithms are reported for the subset of ITC2016 benchmark networks, since the tool currently does not support all the constructs. Some synthetic networks from the same set [13] have been translated from an internal XML description to the ICL format and can be found at the ecosystem's website.
2 .
2 https://gitlab.com/IJTAG/benchmarks/tree/master/ICL 
The networks from the evaluation set differ in the number and type of programmable modules. Table II reports all important characteristics for each of the networks listed in column 1 (Network). Columns 2 and 3 report the total number of reconfigurable modules -number of SIBs and ScanMuxes, respectively. The total number of control bits is given in column Conf. bits. MaxDepth column contains maximum hierarchical depth of the network (for SIB-based networks this value equals to the maximum number of nested SIBs, according to [13] ). The longest path length is reported in Longest path column, while the total number of scan cells in the network can be found in Scan Cells column. Scan  cells  Mingle  10  3  13  4  171  270  TreeBalanced  43  3  48  7  5,219  5,581  TreeFlat Ex  57  3  62  5  5,100  5,195  TreeUnbalanced  28  -28  11  42,630  42,630  a586710  -32  32  4  42,381  42,410  p22810  270  -270  2 The experimental results are given in Table III . For each of the benchmarks in column 1, number of generated configurations is reported in column 2. Column 3 gives the total cost in clock cycles for applying the generated sequence. The key length has been set to 32, while 5 clock cycles are added as JTAG overhead to each of the sessions. Furthermore, the time required by the tool written in Java to apply the algorithm is given in column Runtime. Columns 5 and 6 report on total number of considered faults (excluding implicit ones) and the total number of undetectable faults, respectively. It is worth noting that in all cases applying generated sequence resulted in achieving full coverage.
! !

V. CONCLUSIONS
Reconfigurable Scan Networks provide flexible instrumentation access through dynamic reconfiguration. To ensure there is no mismatch between prototypical device and initial specifications, product life-cycle requires performing (postsilicon) validation before going into the mass production. Such additional effort prevents rendering the whole infrastructure inoperable and avoids enormous re-design costs. In this paper we proposed a mismatch model for post-silicon validation of RSNs. Furthermore, two algorithms have been developed for generating configuration patterns to detect the set of considered mismatches. The ITC2016 benchmark networks were used to evaluate the proposed methodology. We found that in all cases full detection coverage has been reached. For the detection procedure based on the active path length comparison, the tool is able to generate a list of undetectable mismatches. Furthermore, mismatch model is easily extendable, due to the nature of the problem and internal model of the network extracted by the tool.
